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MIND THE GAP1 
 
Social science is public not just in the sense that its findings are publicly available or 
useful to some group or institution outside the scholarly world. It is public in that it 
seeks to engage the public in a process of dialogue … it cannot seek to stay within the 
boundaries of the specialist community while studying the rest of society from 
outside. Robert Bellah, Habits of the Heart (1985). 
 
The end of the Cold War may have been a tragedy for some2 but for the discipline of 
International Relations (IR) it represented the onset of the boom years. So long constrained, 
both theoretically and empirically, by the stranglehold of the Cold War and its Anglo-
American monopoly on methods, concepts and analytical frameworks, the multiple openings 
of the past decade and a half have served, in many ways, to enrich the study of world politics. 
A broadening out of what is considered to be the legitimate terrain of International Relations 
has helped to generate an interstitial opening in which novel frameworks, concepts and issue 
areas have appeared, many of them extremely productive. At the same time, the surge of 
public interest in international relations – albeit more in lieu of its subject matter than its 
disciplinary apertures – has seen a major roll out in new courses and programmes. As the 
world has gone global and politics has gone international, so IR has cashed in.  
 And yet, as the discipline has responded to the openings of the post-Cold War era, 
so deficiencies with its theoretical, analytical and conceptual frameworks have become 
striking. This is hardly surprising – the rapidity of change in the contemporary world 
precludes easy analysis. Yet, albeit with some notable exceptions listed below, it is troubling 
quite how incapable much of the discipline has been at speaking to the imminent range of 
puzzles, questions and problems posed by the hows, whys and wherefores of the 
contemporary conjuncture: the extent to which the essential grammar of world politics has 
been disturbed by the shift in the political imaginary from Westphalia to multiple, often 
deterritorialised, political spaces (although see Ruggie, 1993; Cerny, 1995; Buzan and Little 
2000), from superpower competition to American imperium (although see Barkawi and 
Laffey, 1999; Cox, 2001; and Ikenberry, 2004), and from a discussion of material capabilities 
to relative intangibles such as religion (although see Petito and Hatzapoulos eds., 2003), race 
(although see Shilliam, 2006; Hobson, 2007) and culture (although see Walker, 1990; Lapid 
and Kratochwil eds., 1996; Etzioni 2004).3  
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 Rather than embracing these deep rooted challenges, IR has largely sought to contain 
them within existing paradigms and problem-fields. This has contributed to a knock-on effect 
in which precious few IR theories, old or new, speak effectively to emerging issues which 
move away from existing paradigmatic frontiers: the rise in ethnic conflict (although see 
Gagnon, 2006), the dangers of democratisation (although see Mansfield and Snyder, 2005), 
the emergence of jihadism (although see Halliday, 2005) or the influence of neo-
conservatism (although see Williams, 2005). Even when IR has succeeded in breaking out of 
internecine debates about polarity, balancing and the like, it has tended to abandon its 
primary toolkits. Hence, the analysis provided by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt (2006, 
2007) about the overbearing role of an ‘Israeli lobby’ in the shaping of US foreign policy 
may have been many things – but rooted in realism does not appear to be one of them.4  
 There are a number of reasons why IR has struggled to keep pace with the uncertain 
landscape of the post-Cold War era: the stickiness of Cold War problem fields and 
approaches; the speed to which cognate disciplines have colonised turf one might reasonably 
expect to be occupied by IR (globalisation, empire, and war being some of the more obvious 
examples); the elevation of theoretical and metatheoretical debates in IR over empirical and 
substantive engagements (Brown, 2006); the continued attachment to systemic-level theories, 
whether Waltzian, Wendtian or Buzanian;5 and the tendency of the new breadth of IR to 
foster disciplinary fracturing and tribalism. All too often analytical and conceptual 
frameworks have led to empirical short circuits, or worse, to their abandonment when 
confronted by the world of ‘actually existing international politics’. Even as IR has increased 
in popularity and seen its agenda broadened, so the discipline has struggled to speak to the 
world within which it is situated and which it is charged to study.  
 Interestingly, there is another discipline which has faced similar travails in recent 
years – sociology. And it may be that the debate within sociology about what to do about the 
dissonance between professional development, empirical work and normative engagement 
may offer some useful pointers as to how IR can reconnect with the post-Cold War 
landscape. The first part of this article looks at attempts by some figures in sociology to 
reconfigure the discipline as ‘public’. The second part examines in more depth what this 
project entails and what it precludes, highlighting three pathologies that a public academic 
enterprise needs to avoid. The third section outlines some basic tenets – amounting to a 
manifesto of sorts – for a public International Relations. A brief conclusion summarises the 
argument and suggests ways to take this agenda forward. 
 
 
3 
A PUBLIC SOCIOLOGY 
 
The call to make academic enquiry more relevant to the world in which it is situated is hardly 
new. Indeed, each generation appears to recognise the dangers of an ivory towered cocooning 
of the intellectual imagination. Hence, the presidential address to the fifth American Political 
Science Association by James Bryce (1909:4-5) nearly 100 years ago warned that,  
 
All the general propositions and leading principles of politics get their significance 
and value from their illustrations in concrete. When severed from these they become 
not only comparatively lifeless but also less helpful, because we do not grasp their 
direct application …  Some writers have tried to treat it (political science) as a set of 
abstractions … following the methods of metaphysics and keeping as far from the 
concrete as possible. So much time and toil have been spent on these discussions, but 
what have they given us of substantial worth? 
 
Similar statements have been issued by senior figures in US sociology throughout the post 
war period: in 1946, Carl Taylor (1947:8), President of the American Sociological 
Association (ASA), warned that ‘it takes graduate students five to ten years to recover from 
what happens to them on their graduate training’; in 1963, Everett Hughes (1963:890), also 
President of the ASA, argued that, ‘while professionalisation may raise the competence of 
some, it also limits creative activity, by denying license (PhD) to some who let their 
imagination and their observations run fair afield and by putting candidates for their license  
so long into a straightjacket that they never move freely again’; in 1968, Martin Nicolaus 
famously berated both his fellow panellist (Wilbur Cohen, Secretary for Health, Education 
and Welfare) and the broader membership of the ASA for favouring ‘fat cat’ and ‘jet set’ 
sociology which was unable to speak to the wider milieu within which sociologists worked; 
nearly a decade later, the presidential address to the ASA by Alfred McClung Lee (1976) 
entitled ‘sociology for whom?’ lamented the broad habitualisation of both sociology and 
sociologists into a professional enterprise which was becoming increasingly distanced from 
its field of enquiry.  
 Over recent years, there has been a renewed attempt within sociology to reconnect the 
discipline with its original vocation, ‘searching for order in the broken fragments of 
modernity’ as Walter Benjamin famously described the task of the angel of history. Indeed, 
the former president of the ASA, Michael Burawoy, has argued in numerous texts (2004, 
2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2006; see also Gans, 1989; Blau and Smith eds., 2006) that sociology 
has become tamed and disciplined, immersed in a ‘fractology’ which has seen it lose its triple 
engagement – at once theoretical, empirical and normative – with the ambivalences of 
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modernity. Burawoy argues that the principle raison d’être of sociology is its defence of 
modernity’s losers rather than the lauding of its victors. As such, sociologists should study 
social ruptures and dislocations not just in the abstract but with an overt commitment to 
grounded research and to the possibility of progressive change. For Burawoy, although it is 
possible to recall many public sociologists from both the past and the present who considered 
this ethos as their main motivation – from Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Tocqueville and Tönnies 
to W.E.B. Du Bois, Pitrim Sorokin, David Riesman, Robert Bellah, Daniel Bell, C. Wright 
Mills, Raymond Aron, Pierre Bourdieu, Alaine Touraine, Charles Tilly, and Michael Mann – 
there has been a sense of a decline in the sociological imagination which would have been 
familiar to at least one of these scholars (Mills, 1959) some fifty years ago.  
 The debate over public sociology has been extensive (see, for example, special issues 
devoted to the subject in Social Forces, 2004; the British Journal of Sociology, 2005; 
American Sociologist, 2005; and Critical Sociology, 2005). Critics vary their charges: there is 
uncertainty about the autonomy of any sociological (Calhoun, 2005; Ericson, 2005; Ghamari-
Tabrizi, 2005), or disciplinary (Braithwaite, 2005; Hall, 2005; Aronowitz, 2005) division of 
labour; broader questions about whether public sociology constitutes a discrete field of 
enquiry (Urry, 2005); charges of arrogance (Tittle, 2004); and complaints about fostering 
activism by the back door (Nielsen, 2004). Some of these critiques hit home. It is self-
evidently the case, for instance, that academic research is inherently public, communicated as 
it is via multiple public channels whether these be academic, media or policy-oriented. In 
addition to this, there are well-rehearsed difficulties in delineating what should be considered 
‘progressive’, in valorising activism (Shaw and Walker, 2006), or in romanticising civil 
society (Calhoun, 2005). Much of civil society is, in fact, fairly uncivil: terrorist networks, 
paedophile rings and racist organisations enjoy the capacity to organise and mobilise outside 
state control at least as much as Amnesty, Greenpeace and Jubilee 2000.6 Linked to this, 
some elements of the public academic enterprise may be fairly unpleasant: Charles Murray’s 
The Bell Curve and Samuel Huntington’s Who are We? communicated their ideas very 
successfully to diverse publics, but neither could be considered in any way ‘progressive’.  
In many ways, the debates prompted by the move to public sociology are a return to 
the arguments first mooted by Max Weber (in Gerth and Mills, 1991) nearly one hundred 
years ago, most notably in his 1918 lecture, “Science as a Vocation”. Weber made the case 
for demarcating between value-orientations and academic enquiry, or between adopting 
political positions and conducting scholarship. As such (1991:145-6),  
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To take a political stand is one thing; to analyze political structures and party 
positions is another. When speaking in a political meeting about democracy, one does 
not hide one’s personal standpoint; indeed, to come out clearly and take a stand is 
one’s damned duty … It would be an outrage, however, to use words in this fashion in 
a lecture or in the lecture-room ... the true teacher will beware of imposing from the 
platform any political position upon the student, whether it is expressed or suggested. 
‘To let the facts speak for themselves’ is the most unfair way of putting over a 
political position to the student.  
 
For Weber, although there is a relatively thin line between ‘science’ (academic enquiry) and 
‘politics’ (activism, broadly conceived), the dutiful educator ensured that their role as an 
engaged citizen did not impede on their vocation as a scholar. In this sense, Weber is making 
a crucial point – that academic research should be understandable, explicable and defendable 
on a basis regardless of value orientation and subjective perspective. As such, although value 
commitments can never be completely removed from the object of research, objectivity is 
made plausible via the construction of ideal-typical forms of knowledge which mediate 
between normative engagements, conceptual frameworks and empirical situations (Jackson, 
2007). As such, Weber is suggesting that there are standards to which scholarly work must 
subscribe (of research design, analytical validity, empirical veracity and the like) which can 
be assessed without the need for shared ethical inclinations.  
The sense of a public academic enterprise being advocated here need not detract from 
this sense of “Weberian objectivity” (Jackson, 2007). Indeed, it is worth emphasising the 
sense of autonomy which derives from such an understanding of professional academic 
research (Scott, 2005). Most academics enjoy a relative freedom over what they study, think 
and write which is drawn, at least in part, from the independence of the academy itself. It may 
be that this dimension of speaking truth(s) to power isolates academics in fortified, 
sometimes cloistered, ivory towers, but it also offers them a sense of freedom which enriches 
certain features of academic life. Advocates of public sociology do not deny this point. 
Rather, they argue that the two principal strands of public sociology – traditional public 
sociology which frames matters of high public importance, and organic public sociology 
which is embedded in thick local publics – produce an essential dialogue which can act as a 
formative influence on the discipline and the academy as a whole. In a time of relative 
consensus and conservatism – at least when it comes to questions about the management of 
economies or the capacity of politics to radically reshape people’s lives – public sociology 
grounds and underpins professional and policy sociology, providing a sense of engagement 
without which the profession would have little meaning, slight moral authority and few 
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connections to the students and wider publics who are attracted both to the subject and its 
subject matter. Public sociology, it is argued, forms an essential role in reconnecting 
professional sociology with the passion of public engagement, while at the same time 
offering a defence of civil society and progressive social movements which hardwires in a 
protective umbilical cord between sociology as an academic pursuit and the various publics 
within which it is implanted and with which it shares a responsibility of engagement. This is 
not about the reduction of all such academic enquiry to the level of either political punditry or 
overt activism. Rather, it speaks to the heart of the scholarly vocation: the communication 
and critique of areas of knowledge which derive from value-commitments and yet which 
retain a focus on conceptual, analytical and empirical rigour (Jackson, 2007).  
 Certainly, the idea of public sociology appears to contain several attractive elements. 
First, it offers the chance to provincialize the Anglo-American academy in important ways 
(Quah, 2005), leading us to treat with caution claims based on the universalisation of 
particular histories, contexts and cultures. Indeed, just opening the door to public sociology 
means recognising how sociology varies in form and content around the world – in countries 
such as Brazil, Mexico and South Africa, for example, there is almost nothing except public 
sociology (Baiocchi, 2005; Burawoy 2004b). Second, a public academic enterprise unites the 
world of academic study with what Amitai Etzioni (2005) refers to as the era of ‘popular 
modernity’ in which social movements, produced by increasingly dense state-society 
penetration, become the central outlet for political expression. As such, it offers insights into 
the world of ‘actually existing politics’ which helps to keep research both grounded and 
meaningful. Third, a public academic enterprise helps us move away from conceptual 
abstractions, for example the trinitarian division of state, society and market representing the 
frontiers of politics, sociology and economics respectively, which can easily become reified 
into analytical containers and, thereby, into ontological distinctions (Rosenberg, 1994). The 
hold of these concepts produces a bracketing off of particular areas of study and engenders a 
sense of hierarchy in which status is conferred on those seen to be looking at a discipline’s 
core, a move which is just as problematic within disciplines as between them. In IR, for 
example, the fetishisation of anarchy, Westphalia, sovereignty, the balance of power and 
other such concepts has produced a disciplinary structure in which some areas of study are 
considered more central than others. These others are subsequently left to appear as cutting 
edge (at best) or as peripheral (at worst). Either way the result is the same – marginalisation.  
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THREE PATHOLOGIES 
 
Although the debate surrounding public sociology is still very much being played out, it may 
be that there are important lessons from these discussions which can be gleaned for IR. But 
why prefer a ‘public’ IR to any other means of re-affirming and re-imagining the discipline? 
After all, there is a broad sense of malaise about the capacity of the discipline to cope 
effectively with the vagaries of the post-Cold War world. Equally, there are no shortage of 
responses about how to fill the gap between paradigms and practice, methods and substance, 
theory and history. Of these, perhaps the three most prevalent are the call to make IR more 
‘policy relevant’, the desire to extend IR’s openness to other disciplines, and to seek a higher 
public profile for the discipline. Before moving on to outlining the parameters of a public 
International Relations, therefore, it is worth clarifying how this particular project is distinct 
from these other responses – the valorisation of philosopher kings, the pursuit of 
interdisciplinarity, and the development of IR-receptive public intellectuals. Although there 
may be occasional overlaps between these three arenas and a public IR, the distances between 
them both tease out the distinctiveness of public IR and illustrate ‘three pathologies’ that the 
enterprise would do well to avoid. 
 
Philosopher kings? 
 
It would be easy to see public IR as a venture closely associated with the world of the 
mandarin. After all, if academics want to be more relevant, grounded and meaningful, then 
what better way to do so than by influencing policy making? Also confusing this issue are the 
regular calls which deplore the increasing disconnection between policy making and the 
wider academy (Wallace, 1992; George, 1993; Walt, 2005). Where once, it is argued, a 
transmission belt acted as a fluid carrier for the transfusion of academic ideas into policy, 
now this process has become stilted and uneven. This shift has occurred for a number of 
reasons. First, the heightened professionalisation of the academic career. Tenure track in the 
US, the RAE in the UK as well as numerous other processes have tended to generate a poppy 
field syndrome of publishers, journals and institutions which homogenise what is considered 
to be high quality research. The result is the generation of private languages, fragmentation 
and factionalism (Abbott, 2001) in which academic tribes rarely venture out of their self-
insulated house-arrest.7 This process has produced a striking disengagement with 
policymaking, particularly in the United States where the rise of game theory, an approach 
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which relies on simulating perfect information, removing context and simplifying reality, has 
made much academic work unsuited to a world of policy filled with complexity, 
indeterminacy and imperfection (Walt, 2005). 
 Perhaps more important than professional disengagement, however, is the question of 
the sharpness of the distinction between the two worlds occupied by academics and policy 
makers. First, there is the question of time – while academics work in long-hand and in the 
long-term, policy makers are concerned with the short-hand and the short-term.8 Stephen 
Krasner (2005), discussing his move from Stanford professor to Director for Policy Planning 
at the State Department, sees this as one of the most important distinctions between academia 
and policy making. Politicians simply do not have the time, even if they have the will, to 
read, analyse and engage in any detail with academic debates, let alone read the innumerable 
papers and books devoted to specialist topics. This is the world of the executive summary 
running up against the world of interminable throat clearing. Both suffer from their own 
tyranny: short-termism and the confinements of the politics of the possible for the policy 
maker; the ivory tower and faddism for the academic.9  
The crucial point is that, even when policy makers and academics are working on the 
same topic, their approaches to the issue are usually quite distinct. Hans Morgenthau 
(1970:14) understood this point well, ‘the intellectual lives in a world that is separate from 
that of the politician. The two worlds are separate because they are oriented towards different 
ultimate values … truth threatens power, and power threatens truth’. In reality, professional 
politicians are surrounded by a protective belt of specialist advisers and public servants who 
act as filters on information, adopting explanations which fit with their policy prescriptions 
while ignoring those which appear to be contradictory. Indeed, as David Mosse (2004) 
argues, the ignorance of policy makers is structural rather than inadvertent. When 
intellectuals light up certain aspects of the policy making process via shorthands such as 
globalisation, sustainability, soft power and the like, policy makers often fix policy around 
these master themes. But when more inconvenient facts emerge – that democratisation is 
dangerous, or that terrorist networks cannot be fought as if they were sovereign states – then 
these truths are less likely to feed into policy strategies. In this sense, the relationship 
between academia and policy making is contingent and tangential rather than necessarily 
close – the production of expert knowledge is something of only instrumental interest to the 
practicing politician. In short, the first best world of speaking to truth(s) occupied by most 
academics shares neither the same needs nor comparable notions of time as the second best 
world of speaking to prudence occupied by most policy makers. 
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 Linked to this are the separate cultures within which academics and policy makers 
operate (George, 1993). While academics often seek to squeeze history and empirical 
evidence into their grand schemas, policy makers tend towards ad hoc judgements, carrying 
with them a range of cultural practices ranging from cognitive dissonance to threat inflation 
(Jervis, 1976; Balzacq and Jervis, 2004), and a set of political constraints which are far more 
influential in their decisions than the advice of outside ‘impartial’ observers.10 As such, 
although academics may be able to help with background specialist information (such as 
regional expertise or issue area knowledge), or with the provision of analytical frameworks 
(such as the theory of nuclear deterrence, the democratic peace, or the conceptual apparatus 
provided by globalisation), these are little more than loose maps within which the decision 
maker is left to construct substantive policies (Nincic and Lepgold eds., 2000). In other 
words, academics may be able to establish a context and range of possibilities within which 
policy can be carried out. But the act of policy making itself is subject to all sorts of pressures 
and constraints (sometimes described, or derided, as ‘the statesmen’s lament’) which take 
them away from the ‘purity’ of the academic world. When this division of labour is not 
recognised, when academics cross over into the world of the philosopher-king, dangerous 
policies are often not very far behind, witnessed for example by democracy promotion, a set 
of policies rooted in a particular suite of academic ideas which have been elevated into a 
number of ideological and, at times, utopian political commitments (Lawson, 2008).  
 To be engaged in public academia, therefore, is not the same as making research more 
policy oriented. In fact, the different worlds that policy makers and academics occupy is no 
bad thing. While academics have a duty, if they have one at all, to the pursuit of knowledge 
and, perhaps, to the defence of civil society, politicians and policy makers owe their fidelity 
to the state. As Steve Smith (1997:511) writes, ‘if academics have failed to be involved in the 
policy process, it has more to do with a failure to communicate with the public than with a 
failure to communicate to government’. Connections between these two spheres, when and 
where they are fruitful, should be occasional and organic. Indeed, just by carrying out their 
research, academics contribute to policy by framing problems, filling in necessary empirical 
and conceptual backgrounds, and by providing specialist forms of knowledge. Attempts at 
forcibly marrying the two worlds are likely both to end in failure and to weaken the other’s 
autonomy. In order to function optimally, academics require a critical distance from the state. 
As such, avoiding any necessary fusion between theory and policy – the ‘siren song of policy 
relevance’ (Hill, 1994) – is a core feature of a public academic enterprise.  
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A necessary interdisciplinarity? 
 
The second pathology to avoid is the notion of public International Relations as necessarily 
involving interdisciplinarity. Interdisciplinarity is a term and a concept, which like 
International Relations itself, appears to have captured the zeitgeist. Given that so many 
approaches which speak to the contemporary imagination are trans-disciplinary (post-
structuralism and the broader cultural turn), joint-disciplinary (such as gender and ethnic 
studies), multi-disciplinary (like area studies) or cross-disciplinary (for example, historical, 
economic or political sociology), it is not surprising that there has been a call by both funding 
bodies and the wider academy to work beyond the confines of sometimes arbitrary and 
frequently constraining disciplinary perimeters. This is a move made all the more urgent by 
the non-disciplinary nature of many of the issues which most engage contemporary students 
and academics: religion, culture, terrorism, nationalism, globalisation, multiculturalism and 
so on. Indeed, one celebrated advocate of interdisciplinarity, Immanuel Wallerstein, has 
chaired a commission which made the case for recasting social science as ‘pluralistic 
universalism’, akin ‘to the Indian pantheon, wherein a single god has many avators’ 
(Gulbenkian Commission, 1996:59-60).  
 Wallerstein’s (2004) vision of ‘uni-disciplinarity’ is intended as a return to a 
nineteenth century view of the social scientific enterprise, a time before disciplines sought the 
relative autonomy and security which flowed from establishing discrete disciplinary edges. 
As such, his call – for a renewed general engagement with the ambivalences of modernity – 
certainly overlaps with some dimensions of a public academic enterprise. But for a myriad of 
reasons, conflating these two processes would be deleterious to the public academic 
enterprise. First there is the obvious, although still important, point that interdisciplinarity 
requires disciplines in the first place (Moran, 2006); indeed, the latter provide a necessary 
precondition for interdisciplinarity to take place at all. It is difficult to imagine a ‘back to the 
future’ in which disciplinary boundaries are dissolved. After all, they are reinforced by a 
cornucopia of surveillance mechanisms: professional organisations, academic journals, the 
peer review process, funding councils, assessments of research output and so on. This 
disciplinary and professional separation is not necessarily a bad thing. Although awareness of 
work in other disciplines is part of the lifeblood of the intellectual imagination, it is unlikely 
that engagement with the primary turf of other disciplines can ever take place with the same 
levels of depth or knowledge which specialists bring to a subject. Invariably, it seems, 
interdisciplinarity entails an attraction to the mainstream of another subject, either delivering 
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an off-the-shelf reading of a particular debate, or reading instrumentally about a certain issue 
in a way that precludes understanding of the more interesting terrain which lies beneath the 
surface (Lawson, 2005a). As such, interdisciplinary researchers often lack the means to 
arbitrate between rival specialist interpretations, a process Joseph Bryant (2006) describes as 
‘narrational discordance’. One of the lessons of the last few years of international politics, 
both for government and academics, is that specialist knowledge of an area, issue or language 
(such as the Middle East, Iraq or Arabic) generates a depth of understanding which no 
generalist can match. In this sense, it is worth recognising that the social sciences constitute a 
single family in which some relations, such as that between sociology and anthropology, are 
unnecessarily fractured, it is also worth remembering that other subjects are more distant 
cousins, often for sound reasons. Forms of specialist knowledge tend to take place away from 
the surface level debates occupied by interdisciplinary researchers. But that does not make 
these forms of expertise any less valuable. Just as General Practitioners do not conduct heart 
by-pass operations, hysterectomy’s and neurological procedures, so matters of specialist 
importance are likely to be beyond the purview of those engaged in interdisciplinary rock-
skimming exercises. 
 The issue of interdisciplinarity is a particularly acute one for International Relations. 
As Barry Buzan and Richard Little (2001) point out, IR has a semi-permeable membrane 
which allows ideas from other disciplines in, but blocks substantive traffic out. As politics 
has gone international, so researchers from outside IR have sought to occupy turf one might 
expect the discipline to inhabit. Indeed, figures as diverse as Noam Chomsky, Niall Ferguson 
and Slavoj Žižek have a far higher profile than those who inhabit the discipline of IR even on 
those issues which speak to the heart of contemporary world politics: Iraq, war, the nature 
and extent of American power etc. As Buzan and Little argue, when the question is posed: 
what have other disciplines learned from IR, the cupboard is, ‘if not quite bare, then certainly 
not well stocked’ (2001:20). Buzan and Little claim that this story of one-way traffic stems 
from IR’s triple confinement behind a Eurocentric ahistoricism which isomorphises the 
Westphalian moment, a sectoral narrowness which privileges military and political power 
relations, and an increasing fragmentation into house journals, styles and languages. As they 
write (2001:31), ‘In the end, mainstream IR theory has preferred to think small and narrow 
rather than big and wide’. If we accept this view of IR (and it does not seem very wide of the 
mark), then we can gauge a further weakness inherent in interdisciplinarity: its tendency to 
dissolve into cannibalism. Interdisciplinarity rarely works on a level playing field. More 
often, it works as a means for one discipline to colonise the turf of another. As such, border 
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raids become akin to Viking raiding parties with booty carried off in one direction and little 
to show for it in the other. Indeed, these ‘looting and pillaging raids’ (Mann 1995:555) 
conjure up an image more akin to intellectual asset stripping than to fertile inter-relationship.  
 On the one hand, therefore, interdisciplinarity creates opportunities for what Bruce 
Carruthers (2005) calls ‘constructive misbehaviour’ – a chance for intellectual entrepreneurs 
to act as translators, borrowing concepts and data from one academic discipline and 
introducing them into another.11 Such acts of arbitrage, when they are done well, can reduce 
levels of ‘intellectual autism’ (Steinmetz 2005) – the narrowing of a field under the watchful 
scrutiny of academic homeland security agents. But it is important not to get too carried away 
with openness and fluidity both within disciplines and between them. Interdisciplinarity can 
engender thinness and sloppiness as well as promote depth and rigour. Obscuring root-and-
branch differences can serve to make bridge-building enterprises a metaphor for hostile 
takeovers, a means of amplifying small differences, or of generating intellectual dilettantism. 
Perhaps more importantly given the context of this essay, interdisciplinarity tends to focus on 
horizontal connections between academic disciplines rather than fostering deeper vertical 
relations with broader publics. As such, when the two processes link up, their relationship is 
likely to be contingent rather than necessary. 
 
Public intellectuals? 
 
The third and final pathology which a public academic enterprise should avoid is that of the 
cult of the public intellectual. It is often argued that International Relations lacks the same 
level of public awareness that is enjoyed by cognate disciplines. This is both true and, at least 
to some extent, problematic. In a survey carried out in 2005 by the British magazine Prospect, 
only one academic working in IR, Fred Halliday, made it into the magazine’s list of 100 
leading British public intellectuals. Across the Atlantic, Russell Jacoby (2000), Richard 
Posner (2002), Todd Gitlin (2006) and others have noted the general decline in significance 
faced by public intellectuals in the United States, including those who work in and around IR. 
Although there are some countries – France, Portugal, Brazil, South Africa – where 
academics cross easily into public life, the concern is that, at a time when the world has gone 
global and politics has gone international, the level of public unawareness in International 
Relations makes the subject home to wild conspiracy theories (9/11 as a plot instituted by the 
US government), and specious oversimplifications (the invasion of Iraq as a war for oil). As 
John Hall (2005:379) puts it, ‘isolation from society is dangerous, the breeding ground not 
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just for trivia but also for fantasies of place and power which occasionally have led to 
dreadful historical actions’. 
 However, it is questionable whether the answer to this shortcoming is the 
development and promotion of more IR-receptive public intellectuals. After all, public 
intellectuals, often operating at the edges of, or outside, the academy, tend to mirror the 
process carried out by those academics seeking to become more ‘policy relevant’ – providing 
sound-bites, in this case to the media rather than to policy audiences, about extremely 
complex issues. As such, they are engaged in an important communicative exercise, but not 
one which shares any necessary resemblance to the idea of a public academic enterprise. 
Indeed, fairly often, public intellectuals are either engaged in issues well removed from 
everyday political action such as ‘thin slicing’ (Malcolm Gladwell), ‘inflectional 
morphology’ (Steven Pinker) or ‘the parallax view’ (Slavoj Žižek), or speak for a ‘commons’ 
which they have only rarely encountered (Jeffrey Sachs). To be clear – the point here is not 
that publics are unable to understand, reflect and act upon complex messages. Indeed, some 
public intellectuals – Jonathan Meades for example – communicate difficult concepts both 
clearly and effectively.12 Moreover, all sorts of dense academic texts – Hardt and Negri’s 
Empire for example – manage to cross over from the deepest reaches of academia into the 
public domain. In fact, publics appear to be disengaged less by complexity than by the 
detritus of academic life: unnecessary jargon, interminable navel gazing, narcissistic point-
scoring and the like.13 Perhaps academics should write two versions of every book: one for an 
academic audience; the other a more overtly publicly oriented tract. However, as Stephen 
Chan (2007) notes, there is an additional problem in that the three models of the public 
intellectual – as high priests of the royal court (Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
Condoleezza Rice), as ersatz emancipators from prevalent power structures (Václav Havel, 
Jürgen Habermas), or as activist detectives conducting investigations into the ruinous policies 
of ‘one’s own side’ (Noam Chomsky, John Pilger) – all fail to engage formatively with the 
world beyond and outside the West. As such, they are offering a stilted picture of the world 
concerned with what ‘we’ can do either to or for ‘them’. Either way, this is a symptom of 
closure rather than a process of openness, a form of quarantine which seeks to proclaim 
‘truth’ from on-high rather than to build ‘truths’ from genuine forms of complex solidarity.  
 If the central point of a more publicly oriented academic enterprise is the fostering of 
ties with multiple publics, this is unlikely to be resolved by the emergence of a new 
generation of media savvy IR public intellectuals. These individuals tend to occupy a terrain 
some way removed from the level of grounded research demanded by public IR, writing 
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accessible tracts which sell books, magazines and newspapers but which only tangentially 
bare a resemblance to the type of research which serves as the leitmotif of a public academic 
engagement. While the central component of a public academic enterprise is engagement 
with multiple publics, public intellectuals tend to be populist advocates from ‘on high’. As 
such, although these two worlds may touch on occasion, any such overlap is likely to be both 
restricted and partial. 
 
 
FOR A PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 
If the last section was concerned with what public International Relations is not, this part of 
the essay begins to lay out more constructive foundations for the enterprise. The central 
theme underpinning this section, and the drive towards public IR in general, is what Stephen 
Chan (2003, 2007) calls ‘complex commonality’. Chan’s work on narratology seeks to reveal 
the inter-subjective ‘trans-intellectual histories’ that can act as a dialogue between peoples 
and places. In this essay, I treat the idea of complex commonality as an attempt to mediate 
between particular and universal, understanding that local variations in culture, normative 
frameworks and experiences across time and space preclude simple universalities, but that 
this need not entail a valorisation of minor differences. Rather, immersion in various 
history’s, cultures, normative frameworks and discourses can direct us towards 
commonalities which, in turn, act as building blocks towards shared normative and political 
projects. The unevenness of everyday experiences of global structures – capitalism, 
patriarchy, the states-system and so on – requires neither a flattening of world politics into a 
toneless homogeneity nor a revelling in simplistic heterogeneity. Indeed, beyond the binary 
presented by the bludgeon of homogeneity and the kaleidoscope of heterogeneity lies a more 
complex, intricate story about our global past, present and future. Public IR should be 
concerned with weaving together this shared narrative into intelligible, if dynamic, 
commonalities, performing a task close to what Craig Calhoun (2003) calls 
‘communitarianism in cosmopolitanism’ or what Seyla Benhabib (2002) refers to as 
‘pluralistically enlightened universalism’ – the study of distinct history’s, languages, 
epistemologies and ways of life in order to generate complex forms of cosmopolitan 
engagement. This section seeks to fill in this broad rubric via a discussion of the research, 
teaching, theory, methods, and communicative openings suggested by a public IR. 
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Grounded research … and teaching 
 
The first demand of public IR is that it produces, and is produced by, grounded research. In 
short, this means less time in the ivory-tower and more time engaging with the multiple 
publics that make up the panorama of world politics. This does not mean the conjuring of a 
single global demos, whether this be derived from the twin altars of the Washington 
Consensus or global civil society. After all, there are precious few signs of an emerging 
global demos, and publics around the world seem ill-disposed to issues, threats and 
challenges beyond their immediate borders (Halliday 2004). Rather, in a world in which 
everyday politics is becoming increasingly internationalised, and in which the international is 
becoming a subsequently thick political space, any engagement with multiple publics must by 
definition be international. In this sense, Michael Burawoy (2005a) is right that ‘third wave’ 
public sociology has seen a shift to the international sphere. As such, engagement within the 
multiple publics which make up international politics is a necessary feature of any 
contemporary public academic enterprise. It follows that it must also be the central thrust of 
public IR.  
 The key point is that the direction of this engagement is not just one-way, from grand 
theory, universal abstractions and methodological strictures to the everyday world of 
international politics, but one which allows a genuinely two-way interaction between 
researcher and subject to flow. While this presents its own difficulties – defining the nature, 
scope and limits of ‘international publics’, taking on the time and expense of engagement 
with these publics, and allowing publics to speak not just in bit parts but as central actors – 
the establishment of this dialogic space between academic IR research and the stuff of 
international politics is the sine qua non of public IR. Some examples of this form of research 
are already in evidence – Stephen Hopgood’s (2006) work on Amnesty International, the 
research on globalisation and resistance by Louise Amoore (2002), Anna Stavrianakis’ 
(2006) study of the links between universities and the arms industry, and Patrick Bond’s 
(2003, 2005) conjoining of academic, political and normative engagements over issues of 
basic needs in Southern Africa serve as useful cases in point. But these are exceptions rather 
than the rule – the majority of IR research remains conducted at a relative remove from the 
events, processes and groups which make up everyday international politics. As such, there is 
a substantial gap to fill in terms of this form of research.  
 There are some rudiments of an engagement with ‘everyday’ world politics on which 
a public IR enterprise could be linked. Pace figures such as Michel de Certeau (1988), Henri 
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Lefebvre (1991), and Erving Goffman (1959), some scholars (for example, Hobson and 
Seabrooke eds., 2007) are concentrating less on the 10% of the world which represents the 
exposed tip of world politics than the 90% which lies beneath the surface (Tétrault and 
Lipshutz, 2005). This may seem an obvious point. After all, precious few political scientists 
would study democracy merely by voting – all 72 minutes of it that one scholar, Paul 
Ginsborg (2005), calculates that voters in democracies spend at the ballot box during their 
lifetimes. And yet, asking questions about ‘who acts’ rather than ‘who governs’ (Hobson and 
Seabrooke eds., 2007) presents a very different agenda than is normally taken up in IR or 
IPE. Indeed, inverting the iceberg generates a focus on ‘the art of the weak’ (Goffman, 1959): 
the subtle and common ways in which everyday acts of subversion and resistance – verbal 
taunts, subversive stories, rumour and innuendo – are used around the world (Kerkvliet, 
2005). Beyond this aspect of everyday world politics are more dramatic processes, for 
example the ways in which anti-colonial movements take on the language, norms and 
strategies of colonial powers in order to reveal the contradictions present in metropolitan 
discourse and action. This process of ‘symbolic ju-jitsu’ (Scott, 1987) is present in both the 
‘mimetic challenge’ (Bhabha, 1990) presented by third world revolutionaries and the 
dystopian visions of Osama Bin Laden and his followers (Lawrence, 2005). As such, it serves 
as a useful way into areas of study which IR often either fails to fully recognise or seeks to 
co-opt into pre-existing frameworks. 
 A focus on ‘everyday’ world politics, already a staple of fields such as post-colonial 
studies (Darby, 2004; Dutton, 1998), carries the prospect of opening up fertile turf in 
international studies, most notably in its capacity to weave together a number of apparently 
disparate trends in the discipline, not least the turn towards the individual subject in 
normative IR (as witnessed by the increasing attention paid to human security issues, the 
emergence of the International Criminal Court, or the burgeoning focus on liberal human 
rights) and a renewed interest in notions of international community and society (see, for 
example Barry Buzan’s (2004) articulation of interhuman relations as a ‘first order society’). 
To take a more concrete example, Arlene Tickner’s (2003) work on distinguishing a 
particularly Latin American IR scholarship reveals a number of intriguing points: that such 
scholarship tends to neglect hard-and-fast distinctions between international and domestic 
politics, unsurprising perhaps given the manifold ways in which external forces have affected 
domestic politics in Latin America; that there is a close relationship between theory and 
practice in Latin American IR, most notable in the elevation of academics to key political 
posts; and a lack of attention, again perhaps unsurprsingly, to issues of anarchy. Few theorists 
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in non-metropolitan parts of the world claim to see anarchy rather than hierarchy – whether 
hegemonic or imperial – when they look out of the window.  
 These examples, although hardly widespread and certainly primarily immanent, do 
provide a sense of the ways in which a public International Relations enterprise could provide 
some added value to the discipline. Importantly, the need to establish two-way dialogues 
between scholars and the publics which constitute everyday world politics is not one 
restricted to research. It is also an important feature of teaching International Relations. The 
increasing popularity of IR around the world is fairly straightforward to understand. As 
politics has gone international, so students are becoming increasingly tuned in, both 
politically and normatively, to what they understand to be the subject matter of IR: human 
rights, terrorism, environmental issue, ethnic conflict, war, migration, globalisation and so on. 
Yet frequently, rather than using these engagements as a means of affecting and reflecting 
upon our teaching, we see them as diversions to be socialised into the discipline, to be given a 
‘proper’ framework, to be mapped onto existing problem fields and paradigms (Shaw and 
Walker, 2006; Eschle and Maiguashca, 2006). As such, IR as a discipline is not only missing 
out from a research-led engagement with international publics, it is also failing to develop its 
teaching in response to the ways in which students are brought into the subject. All too often, 
reforming courses becomes the addition of an extra week on ‘new security threats’, the 
question of how well Iraq conforms to the ‘just war tradition’, or how closely American 
preponderance corresponds to the predictions of balance of power theory rather than an 
exercise in how well, and to what extent, the discipline understands the novel ways in which 
students conceptualise and engage with international politics. As such, a central task of public 
IR is working out ways in which teaching, as well as research, can build from rather than on 
the interests of students attracted to the discipline.  
 
Action guiding theory 
 
A second, and linked, component of public IR is the provision of what Chris Brown (2006) 
(pace Stephen White) calls ‘action guiding theory’.  Over recent years, IR theory has become 
an industry in its own right – indeed one which has outgrown any soubriquet of ‘cottage’. In 
many ways, this is a progressive step – a more philosophically rigorous enterprise is 
productive in its own right and can provide firmer foundations for empirical research. And 
yet, all too often, the search for more theory has led to three barren wastelands: the desire to 
retain scientific credentials which continue to provide a narrow, overly rigid, sense of 
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hierarchy within the discipline; a case of philosophical overstretch in which old debates are 
reinvented apparently ad infinitum;14 and a failure to engage substantively with the substance 
of world politics itself. In general terms, IR theory has become ‘the new black’ (Brown, 
2006). Meta-theoretical debates, the turn to Schmitt, Lakatos and others, and a general rise in 
methodological awareness are all important dimensions in the opening of IR as a field of 
study. But to some extent this turn has taken place with a sense of remove from, and 
occasionally distrust towards, the actual stuff of world politics, providing a tyranny of 
method over substance which does a disservice to both enterprises. 
 Public IR, while understanding the need for professionalism and depth in IR theory, 
takes the enterprise as a means rather than as an end. In other words, theory serves as a means 
to deepen, broaden and contextualise action-led research rather than operating as an end 
which subverts the need for empirical research. In this sense, while all IR students and 
scholars should be aware of broader issues of philosophy and political theory, these areas 
should not be fetishized or granted a status above that of hands-on research. In a similar vein, 
the status of star-gazing methodological technicians, particularly in the United States, is of 
much less utility to public IR than an understanding of what Adam Przeworksi (1996) calls 
‘methodological opportunism’ – the idea of a research strategy drawn from a particular 
puzzle or engagement with a substantive field of enquiry. Neither theory nor methods should 
be imposed on particular subject areas. Nor should they be seen as zero-sum specialisms 
which remove the need for substantive research. For its part, public IR should eschew any 
such trade-off, making a concerted engagement with political and normative issues the 
starting point of its research. Occupying the ‘the eclectic messy centre’ (Evans 1996) of 
debates about theory and methods generates a research process which is premised in the first 
instance upon empirical, political and normative engagements with the events, issues and 
processes which make up the marrow of world politics itself. 
 Public IR, therefore, is primarily envisaged as occupying turf around middle range 
theory, embracing complexity, contingency, and context but also examining the ways in 
which particular experiences conjoin with wider processes across time and place. As a result, 
public IR tends towards ethnography (e.g. Vaughan, 2005), analytical history (e.g. Hall, 
2005), and multiple levels of analysis (e.g. Sartori, 1970) in the generation of conditional 
generalisations rooted in time and place specificities. If the world is messy, complex and at 
times, contradictory, then research which finds common patterns, trends and trajectories from 
empirical analysis rather than one which seeks to impose monolithic order on historical 
ambiguities is likely to yield a far richer picture. As such, public IR is rooted in the 
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substantive application of social relations as they are constituted in time and place, followed 
by the examination of how far these social processes and social facts are generalisable across 
both time and space. This brings it into contact with a number of fields of research already 
prevalent in IR, most notably historical sociology (Lawson, 2006, 2007), which also carry out 
this type of research. Practical examples on which to build include exploration of how time 
and space differentiation impacts on general abstractions such as empire (Lieven, 2001; 
Mann, 2003) and revolution (Halliday, 1999; Lawson, 2005b).  
 
A double engagement 
 
A third dimension of public IR is its concern with normative, politically engaged work. Those 
working in the field of public IR should recognise that facts are value laden, but that values 
too are factually embedded. As Heikki Patomäki and Colin Wight (2000) observe, this leads 
to a simple desire to make values factually explained, and facts subject to critical evaluation. 
The result is a connection, or perhaps a reconnection, between the world of ethical 
deliberation and the world of causal processes far removed from the banalities of ‘value-free’ 
abstract research programmes, ‘orphans of the scientific revolution’ (Puchala, 2003) as they 
are. In this sense, public IR critiques the way in which much of the contemporary academy, 
both in IR and beyond, endorses a bureaucratic enterprise which restricts the intellectual 
imagination, factors out the passion inherent in political contestation, and limits academic 
research to being an executive arm of the state apparatus. The narrowing of work behind the 
walls of what is considered to denote a professional academic discipline has served to blind 
scholars and students to the importance of this double engagement – both political and 
intellectual – with the essence of world politics. The ‘objectification’ of research, part of the 
lifeblood of positivism, has hidden the overt, normative engagement with research and 
politics which was once the cornerstone of classical social science, and which lies at the heart 
of most public and student engagement with academic enquiry today. A task for public IR is 
to restore a sense of humanism to the discipline, and in the process, to unite the world of 
human agency with the apparently impersonal structural forces, and professional blinkers, 
which serve to constrain research in the field. Public IR aims to take human relations and 
their crystallisation in historical conditions as its primary area of interest. As such, it promises 
the study, articulation and representation of ‘we’ rather than ‘they’, or ‘it’. 
 Public IR, therefore, as well as being concerned with the extent to which notions of 
value rationality, axiomatic rationality or bounded rationality serve as useful additions to 
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instrumentality as the building block for IR research, should also take an interest in what is 
missing from this debate – the world of ‘unreason’. The politics of ‘unreason’ ranges from 
empathy (as distinct from sympathy) with the articulation of alternative understandings of 
‘the international’, to concern with the beliefs and emotions – anger, fear, love – which 
constitute a politics of commitment. These stimulations to action lie at the heart of 
international politics – the motivations of suicide bombers, or those who take part in ethnic 
cleansing and revolutionary movements – and yet which seem to have little in common with 
the world of instrumental reason. IR still seems caught in a state of myopia towards the 
numerous psychological research over the last thirty years which has explored the ways in 
which rationality is, in fact, dependent on psychological states such as emotions. As Jonathan 
Mercer argues (2005:94), ‘emotion precedes choice (by ranking one’s preferences), emotion 
influences choice (because it directs one’s attention and is the source of action), and emotion 
follows choice (which determines how one feels about one’s choice and influences one’s 
preferences)’. Hence, psychological states should be seen less as a means of explaining non-
rational mistakes, but more as something deeply woven into the fabric of rationality itself. By 
draining psychology from rationality, Mercer argues, rational choice approaches collapse into 
normative ceteris paribus statements which rely, unwittingly and without acknowledgement, 
on what he calls ‘folk psychology’. And as Tarak Barkawi (2004, 2007) makes clear, 
removing emotions from political choices and imposing ‘our’ views on ‘the other’ of 
international politics is unlikely to achieve either understanding or explanation of why, for 
example, young Muslims are willing to lay down their lives for the cause of jihadism. 
Difficult though this may be, grass roots knowledge, specialist understanding and immersion 
in the everyday world of international politics help to provide a decoding which, in turn, 
should yield results which go much deeper than abstracting motives from others which they 
do not appear to hold for themselves.  
 
Multiple channels of communication 
 
The fourth and final dimension of public IR is to think much more fluidly about the multiple 
ways in which IR is communicated. Rather than endorsing the homogenisation of what is 
considered to be the ‘proper’ means of communicating scholarship via niche journals, 
university presses and other forms of regulated texts, a public IR would be much more open 
to how communication both with and between international publics and professional 
researchers takes place. Public discourse carried out via blogs (such as 
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http://duckofminerva.blogspot.com/), e-zines (such as www.opendemocracy.net), online 
networks (such as global exchange), talks, reports, magazines and other non-peer reviewed 
publications provide relatively open channels of communication, translation and ‘back 
translation’ (Buroway, 2005c) which can help to foster a sense of two-way communication 
between public and academy.  It might also be worth considering the important ways in 
which visual forms of communication could play a greater role in the discipline, for example 
by exploring more explicit links between visual cultures and IR. The politics department at 
Goldsmiths, University of London, has recently become home to an artist in residence who is 
working on multiple projects which open up non-textual dimensions to learning, thinking 
about and researching international politics. The department has begun to introduce non-
textual assessments for its students – including videos and other forms of artwork – in an 
attempt to demonstrate how international politics is constituted by day-to-day visual 
interactions as well as by more formalised textual communications. Importantly, these means 
of transmission move away from a mono-directional imparting of knowledge towards a 
mutual exchange of views, opening a much wider sense of the world of international relations 
than is conjured by the discipline to date.  
 Of course, the prospects of these forms of communication run into immediate 
obstacles, not least how forms of unconventional intellectual exchange impact on 
professional processes such as tenure review. It may or may not be the case that scholars such 
as Juan Cole and Dan Drezner have been rejected for tenure at high-profile universities (Yale 
and Chicago respectively) because of their blogs, but regardless, it is clear that taking an 
overt normative stance on a particular issue, or using an alternative forum for displaying 
these views, is not yet something academic institutions find easy to grasp. Nor does academic 
activism necessarily translate into successful political interventions. For example, the attempt 
at “Weberian activism” (Jackson and Kaufman, 2007) instituted by ‘Security Scholars for a 
Sensible Foreign Policy’ did not make the substantive public impact over the war in Iraq that 
its signatories envisioned, a failure shared by many other such ventures over previous years 
and decades. And yet, there are increasing instances in which interventions via 
unconventional ‘fifth estate’ media are infiltrating mainstream politics, whether this be over 
the resignation of Trent Lott or the outing of Valerie Plame (Drezner and Farrell, 2004). Over 
time, it may be that such forms of engagement will help to recast traditional sites of academic 
gatekeeping (Drezner, 2006). What is clear is that opening up processes of communicative 
exchange are bound up with deeper social trends – not least debates about partisanship in the 
media – which are only just beginning to take place.  
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THE DUAL MANDATE 
 
Public International Relations is not intended to be a new master-category for the discipline. 
Rather, this essay has sought to open up a space for public IR within the glasnost currently 
gripping the discipline. It has outlined an enterprise based on complex commonality, 
grounded research, action guiding theory, political and normative engagement, and multiple 
channels of communication. Clearly, given the relatively youthfulness of this form of 
research, this essay has only been able to provide the bare bones of what a more pronounced 
engagement with public IR would involve. As such, it is an opening – or suggestion – for 
further debate; researchers will have to decide for themselves ‘how far along the action chain’ 
(Etzioni, 2005) of public IR they are prepared to go. The key point is to visualise public IR as 
part of the broader fabric of the discipline rather than as a subaltern option to be seen as 
second tier, private or marginal. It may be that relatively few students and scholars choose 
more than a taste from its menu. After all, as noted above, public International Relations runs 
counter to numerous trends within the discipline – how status is conferred, the tendency to 
factionalism, and the shortage of time, funds and interest in grass roots research. 
Nevertheless, public International Relations has potentially important benefits for the 
discipline as a whole, not least in the ways it can help to reconnect the subject to its students 
and to the subject matter of the rapidly changing world within which the discipline is 
embedded, and yet which it often seems content to ignore.  
 In general, public International Relations represents a step away from cloistered 
scholasticism towards a more concerted engagement with the multiple publics which 
constitute everyday world politics. As such, public IR looks outwards rather than inwards, to 
complexity rather than parsimony, and to concrete research rather than meta-abstractions. 
Perhaps it is a curse for the current generation of IR scholars and students to live in 
interesting times, a world of rapid, turbulent and often unsettling changes. But it would be a 
far greater curse if this time was spent on protracted bouts of navel gazing and on attempts to 
rescue and revive outdated approaches, paradigms and worldviews, only coming up for air to 
find that the world has moved on. In this sense, public IR joins part of a wider opening in the 
social sciences represented by the Perestroika movement in Political Science, the shift 
towards a post-autistic economics, the move towards public sociology outlined earlier in this 
essay, as well as the return of a closer relationship between academic work and political 
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activism as represented by the Caucus for a New Political Science in the United States and 
the Network of Activist Scholars of Politics and International Relations in the UK (Herring, 
2006). These openings signal at least a partial return to what Earl Rubington and Martin 
Weinberg (2003:361) call the dual mandate, an academic vocation intended ‘to solve social 
problems as well as to develop disciplines’. Rubington and Weinberg see sociologists as 
playing four roles: ‘theorist, researcher, applier, and critic’. Until recently, IR has seemed 
infatuated with just the first of these, with perhaps a side order of the second. In a time of 
both great opportunity, and also great challenges, for IR, it is time to cast the net wider and to 
seek a more consolidated engagement with the third and fourth of these challenges, in the 
process opening up dialogue with the multiple publics which constitute world politics. 
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Endnotes 
 
 
                                                 
1 Although I am now based at LSE, this essay is very much borne of my time at Goldsmiths. 
Indeed, the engagements which lie behind this article reside in numerous conversations with 
former colleagues at Goldsmiths, most notably Gonzalo Pozo-Martin, Michael Dutton, 
Sanjay Seth and Jasna Dragovic-Soso. Paul Kirby, Patrick Jackson, Bryan Mabee and Faiz 
Abuani provided excellent comments on earlier drafts of the piece as did two anonymous IPS 
reviewers. Primary thanks must go to the students of the BA and MA programmes in 
International Studies at Goldsmiths. I’m not sure how far along the action chain of public IR 
many students went – or will go in the future – but if there were doubts, these were rarely 
made public. For that I am extremely grateful.  
2 For example, the maverick British politician George Galloway referred to the collapse of 
the Soviet Union as the ‘single biggest catastrophe of my life’. Hattenstone, Simon. 
September 16, 2002. Saddam and Me: Interview with George Galloway. The Guardian.  
3 I am not seeking to make the point that these exceptions serve as examples of public IR. To 
the contrary, my point is that these publications are amongst the best attempts to deal with the 
multiple openings of post-Cold War IR without recasting the enterprise in any kind of 
‘public’ fashion.  
4 Mearsheimer and Walt argue that the Israeli lobby, an informal alliance of public and 
private groups and individuals, exercises adverse influence over US foreign policy via a 
mixture of political pressure, media manipulation and through silencing academic debate. 
Whether or not readers agree with these conclusions, the analysis provided by Mearsheimer 
and Walt hardly appears to be a recognisably realist argument, whether classical, structural or 
neo-classical. For a rebuttal of Mearsheimer and Walt’s argument, see Dershowitz (2006). 
5 The extent to which systemic level theories fail by necessity to capture reality is a point 
made well by Michael Mann (2006:344): ‘there is no singular world system, no singular 
process of globalisation, no multi-state system dominated by a singular realist logic. History 
is not the history of class struggles or of modes of production, or of epistemes or discursive 
formations, cultural codes or underlying structures of thought governing the language, values, 
science and practices of an era, underpinned by a singular process of power enveloping all 
human activity. These system theories succeed in capturing theorists, not social reality’. 
6 This issue is even more thorny when elevated to the international realm. Beyond the 
question of where one can locate ‘global publics’, it is difficult to imagine any such sphere 
without understanding the central part played by states in forming an international public 
space (Colas, 2002). Contemporary transnational social movements pale in comparison to 
their nineteenth and twentieth century forbearers – whether socialist, feminist, or 
revolutionary – in their capacity to transgress borders. And states, whether rightly or wrongly, 
continue to be the principal sites of representation and accountability in international politics, 
something many activists seem to acknowledge by their extensive lobbying of influential 
state actors, often acting as advocacy networks which speak for rather than with the publics 
they purport to represent (Chandler, 2004a). Indeed, this ‘courtier politics’ is, to some extent 
at least, rooted in a refusal to engage with collective progressive struggles in favour of an 
agent-less, individualist ethics which sees the international, or global, sphere as a release 
from the attenuation of political contestation in the West (Chandler, 2004b). 
7 This process has been intensified by a considerable growth in niche journals. The 
International Studies Association now produces five official journals aimed at what are 
considered to be distinct audiences within the discipline, while a growing number of journals 
are geared for specialist fields, hence the recent emergence of the Journal of Intervention and 
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State Building, and perhaps more strikingly, Translocations: The Irish Migration, Race and 
Social Transformation Review. Linked to this are the emergence of ever increasing specialist 
groups within professional organisations. The International Studies Association now has 
twenty-three discrete sections, while the British International Studies Association has fifteen 
affiliated working groups, many of which have appeared only in the last few years.  
8 If, as Schopenhauer thought, current events are ‘the second hands of history’, then policy 
makers work in seconds while academics, in contrast, tend to operate for some of the time in 
minutes, more frequently in hours, and on occasion in days. 
9 Edward Said writes forcefully on the tendency of western academics to embrace faddism: 
‘cults like post-modernism, discourse analysis, New Historicism, deconstruction, and neo-
pragmatism transport academics into the country of the blue; an astonishing sense of 
weightlessness with regard to the gravity of history and individual responsibility fritters away 
attention to public matters, and to public discourse … Western intellectuals choose 
theoretical positions with about the same effort and commitment required in choosing items 
from a menu’. In Chan (2007:1). 
10 Often these processes generate their own pathologies. As Philip Tetlock (2005) points out, 
specialists are actually less good at predicting events in their field as non-experts, having a 
tendency to over-extrapolate from the past to the future. This is, in many ways, unsurprising. 
After all, experts are not neutral observers but partisans who have a vested interest in 
explaining and predicting a certain chain of events. As such, they have an in-built tendency 
towards motivated bias and groupthink, a point well made thirty years ago by Robert Jervis 
(1976) and more recently by Michael Freeden (2003). 
11 Illustrative examples of fruitful interdisciplinarity include the concept of ‘punctuated 
equilibrium’, first mooted by the biologist Stephen Jay Gould to describe the switch-points in 
which long periods of stable reproduction within complex systems are punctuated by short, 
periods of rapid change. Gould’s concept has been usefully transported into numerous ‘soft’ 
academic sciences. Another pertinent example is the concept of ‘path dependence’ which 
originated in economic history and has become used in many disciplines to describe how 
small initial distinctions are amplified over time, becoming substantial schisms which are 
then difficult to reverse. 
12 The series on British television which Meades fronted on the architecture of the Third 
Reich and Soviet Russia is illustrative of the ways in which complex ideas can be translated – 
often through humour – without sacrificing intellectual content.  
13 I am grateful to Paul Kirby for stressing this point to me. 
14 For example, much of the debate about theory in IR is a rehash of a much older division 
between the Austrian School and the German Historical School over scientific method: the 
Methodenstreit. The German Historical School argued that, rather than focusing on universal 
truisms modelled on homo economicus, the line which was pursued by the Austrian School of 
classical economists, economic processes operated within a social framework which was in 
turn shaped by cultural and historical forces. Hence, Gustav Schmoller and his associates 
favoured historical, comparative research that could uncover the distinctive properties of 
particular economic systems. The core debates of the original Methodenstreit continue to 
reverberate around contemporary social science and, in particular, IR: the degree to which 
people’s actions are shaped by their social, historical and normative contexts as opposed to 
the view of individuals as universally driven homo politicus or homo economicus; preferences 
as exogenously generated by social institutions or the endogenous result of primal drives; 
rationality as a broad category embracing a range of motivations versus rationality as a 
narrow, limited realm of utility maximisation. 
